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CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

A Response to Steve Vladeck and Kevin Jon Heller
By Peter Margulies

Saturday, July 27, 2013, 8:40 AM

In recent posts both on Lawfare and at Opinio Juris, Steve and Kevin Jon Heller (here and here) sharply critiqued the brief that Jim Schoettler and I
led on Thursday for Former Government Of cials, Former Military Lawyers and Scholars of National Security Law asking the en banc D.C. Circuit to
uphold the military commission conviction of Ali Hamza al Bahlul, a former aide to Osama bin Laden. Both Kevin and Steve care deeply about the
fairness of military commissions, as do amici – many of whom as Judge Advocates served as defense counsel demanding fairness for their own
clients. As his post demonstrates, Kevin has an encyclopedic knowledge of the development of international criminal law (ICL) from Nuremberg to
the present. Unfortunately, Kevin doesn’tfully acknowledge the consistency of amici’s position with the jurisprudence of the international criminal
tribunals for Rwanda (ICTR) and the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Much of Kevin’s disagreement with amici’s position is, at root, disagreement with
these tribunals’ precedents. In the same vein, much of Steve’s comment signals disagreement with harmless error jurisprudence. Neither Kevin nor
Steve dispute the rst point in the brief, that al Bahlul’s role in the preparation for the 9/11 attacks constituted participation in a Joint Criminal
Enterprise (JCE) to murder civilians. (See my analysis at pp. 84-87 and Jens David Ohlin’s ne article.) As the ICTY Appeals Chamber said in
Prosecutor v. Brdanin (2007) and the ICTR Appeals Chamber said in Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba (Oct. 2004), JCE entails intentional participation in a
common plan to commit a subsequently completed war crime. Both the ICTY and the ICTR have characterized JCE as a form of responsibility under
customary international law that precisely tracks the elements of conspiracy as a mode of liability for a completed war crime. JCE is broad:
participation in even “one aspect” of the plan is suf cient. That breadth is necessary because tribunals from Nuremberg to the present have
understood that concerted conduct yields vast opportunities for plausible deniability. Putting an “end to impunity,” as the Preamble to the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court put it, therefore requires greater accountability for an individual who “aids, abets, or otherwise assists” in
the commission of a war crime. Kevin is nervous about JCE’s breadth, and about the tribunals’ view that JCE is customary international law

(CIL). However, viewing JCE as CIL serves the same function as JCE’s breadth: it limits impunity. As Beth van Schaack noted in an
insightful paper, both transnational tribunals and the U.S. Supreme Court (in cases like Quirin and Yamashita reviewing military
commission decisions) have regarded entrenched custom as providing ample guidance for individuals who wish to conform their conduct
to legal requirements. CIL therefore also provides robust support in transnational and military tribunals for holding accountable those
who violate legal norms.
How did al Bahlul assist in the JCE that led to 9/11? In a letter to senior Al Qaeda gure Ramzi bin al Shibh, al Bahlul
described his own role in the 9/11 preparations as “simple.” In executing a plan to commit mass murder of civilians, the simple contribution can
make a difference. Bahlul’s contribution started, as his letter to bin al Shibh admitted, by ensuring that Mohammed Atta and Ziad al Jarrah swore a
bayat or loyalty oath to Osama bin Laden. The bayat to Atta, the 9/11 plot’s ringleader in the United States, and al Jarrah, the pilot on Flight 93
(which crashed in Pennsylvania), set the 9/11 machinery in motion. The bayat bound Atta and al Jarrah to “obey [bin Laden] at all times” and “die
for the sake of Jihad… against the American[s] and the Jews.”
Al Bahlul didn’t merely admit this in his letter to bin al Shibh – he also acknowledged it in interviews with the FBI conducted by former agent Ali
Soufan, who practiced interrogation the old-fashioned way, through guile and building rapport. Al Bahlul told Soufan that all Americans, including
women and children, served in some fashion as supporters of the U.S. government and were therefore appropriate targets. Moreover, Soufan
testi ed at trial that Bahlul had acted as Atta and al Jarrah’s minder in bin Laden’s compound, grooming them for a mission of particular
“sensitivity.” It is irrelevant that al Bahlul may not have had advance knowledge of the speci cs of the 9/11 attacks. The ICTY has repeatedly said
that a defendant need not have advance knowledge of a particular war crime, if the defendant intentionally participates in a common plan to
commit a war crime such as the murder of civilians and that war crime occurs. The evidence for JCE in al Bahlul’s case is actually well above the
ICTY’s threshold. Kevin and Steve save much of their ire for amici’s argument that errors in the charges and instructions were harmless. Here, too,
Kevin’s beef is not with amici’s arguments, but with the ICTY. In Prosecutor v. Kvočka (Appeals Chamber 2005), the ICTY held that charges need not
be models of precision, as long as defendants have notice of the “factual basis of the charges against them.” Similarly, in Prosecutor v. Mucić
(Appeals Chamber 2001), defendants convicted of aiding and abetting abuses in a detention camp they had run asserted on appeal that the charges
against them did not speci cally mention aiding and abetting. In paragraph 350 of its decision, the ICTY acknowledged that the charges “could (and
should) have been expressed with greater precision.” Despite this acknowledgment, the tribunal found that a statement of the prosecution’s theory
of the defendants’ command responsibility for the camp plus a “general reference” to the tribunal’s governing statute was an “adequate basis” for
the conviction. Al Bahlul had more notice than these ICTY defendants. His charging documents listed his giving the bayat to Atta and al Jarrah as
an overt act furthering both conspiracy and material support. The charging documents also listed his “preparing” the martyr wills of Atta and al
Jarrah “in preparation for the acts of terrorism” committed on 9/11. Al Bahlul, who had sought to represent himself at trial (rarely a good idea, as
I’m sure Kevin would admit), made statements to the court that revealed a clear understanding of the rami cations of those overt acts for his own
defense. (The excellent David Frakt, an Air Force JAG of cer and legal academic who has written about Guantanamo here, was assigned to serve as
defense counsel in the case and was present when al Bahlul spoke. However, al Bahlul’s lengthy comments on the record, see, e.g., page 167 of the
trial transcript (noting to court that, “What I did and I will do... is to kill Americans”), suggest that the court in practice gave al Bahlul a great deal of
leeway in articulating his own arguments without assistance of counsel). In his statements to the court at pages 193-94 of the transcript, al Bahlul
echoed what he had said in his letter to Ramzi bin al Shibh and his FBI interview: that he gave the bayat to Atta and al Jarrah. He also touted the
analysis he provided at bin Laden’s request on 9/11’s effects on the United States. Al Bahlul might have been well-advised to take a different tack at
trial, just as he might have been better off not sending his letter to bin al Shibh or talking so freely with the FBI. Kevin seems shocked that a
defendant could act against his own interests, and attributes al Bahlul’s approach to lack of adequate notice of the charges against him. However,

not all defendants follow their own best interests. Some, like al Bahlul, whose specialty prior to his capture was “media relations” for Al Qaeda, view
trials as vehicles for propaganda. Al Bahlul’s tactics were driven by that agenda. Although Kevin and Steve argue that the members of the military
commission in al Bahlul’s case never found that his conduct related to the September 11 attacks, the members’ speci c ndings prove otherwise.
Those speci c ndings rebut Steve’s reliance on Apprendi, which involved a judge making ndings that properly were the province of the jury. In al
Bahlul’s case, the members of the commission speci cally found that the defendant had given the bayat to Atta and al Jarrah. This nding also
serves as a nding that the defendant had participated in a JCE, even though the instruction erroneously stated that conviction did not require a
completed war crime. The members could have made their nding regarding the bayat only if they credited the evidence supplied by the defendant’s
letter to Ramzi bin al Shibh. In that letter, the defendant described himself as playing a “simple... indirect role” in the 9/11 attacks. As Steve and
Kevin agree, that description ful lls the requirements for JCE. To nd that the defendant did not participate in a JCE, the commission members
would have had to disagree with the defendant’s description of his own conduct, which they had already credited regarding his giving the bayat to Atta
and al Jarrah. The commission members would also have had to disregard Ali Soufan’s testimony about the bayat’s signi cance and al Bahlul’s role
as Atta and Jarrah’s minder. In theory, a fact nder could so nd – but in practice the link between the commission members’ ndings and the
evidence in the record supported the defendant’s guilt on a JCE theory beyond a reasonable doubt. In analogous cases, such as Neder v. United States
(1999), the Supreme Court has viewed instructions that misstated elements of offenses as harmless error. The same conclusion should apply here.
In contrast, the Supreme Court’s decision in McCormick v. United States (1991), which Steve cites, isn’t really a criminal procedure case at all. It
addresses a substantive question of statutory interpretation, holding that a legislator does not violate a federal anti-corruption statute, the Hobbs
Act, by receipt of campaign contributions from constituents and subsequent acts that bene t those constituents, without a more speci c quid pro
quo. In writing for the majority, Justice White observed that the judge’s instruction permitting the jury to nd a violation without a quid pro quo
exceeded Congress’s intent, because “[s]erving constituents and supporting legislation that will bene t the district... is the everyday business of a
legislator.” Moreover, the court below had af rmed the conviction without even considering whether the trial court’s instructions were erroneous.
McCormick continues to trigger controversy as a statutory interpretation case, but it has little or nothing to say about harmless error. Kevin’s
analysis of Justice Stevens’ footnote 32 in Hamdan I similarly misses the mark. Stevens’ core concern in this footnote and throughout his plurality
opinion on conspiracy (not joined by Justice Kennedy, incidentally) was that Hamdan’s conduct as Osama bin Laden’s driver was simply not a war
crime. Stevens asserted that the charge against Hamdan of conspiracy as an inchoate offense involving mere agreement wasn’t recognized under
international law (and amici agree). As Kevin recounts, Stevens then criticized Justice Thomas’s argument that Hamdan could have been (but
wasn’t) charged with other offenses. However, Kevin fails to note that, according to Justice Stevens, those other offenses alsowere insuf cient
predicates for commission jurisdiction in Hamdan’s case. For example, Stevens observed that Hamdan could not have been charged with “aiding the
enemy,” since as a Yemeni national with no ties to the U.S., Hamdan did not “owe allegiance to the party whose enemy he is alleged to have aided.”
Justice Stevens and others who joined his plurality opinion could well have distinguished al Bahlul’s case from Hamdan’s, given the evidence that al
Bahlul participated in a JCE. Based on the record, the en banc D.C. Circuit can make this distinction. In sum, Kevin and Steve’s disagreement is not
with amici, but with developments in ICL and U.S. criminal procedure law that Kevin and Steve nd unfair to defendants. That is a legitimate view.
However, Congress is constrained by the Constitution, not by Kevin’s opinions on how ICL should develop or Steve’s views about the harmless error
rule. Here, international precedent recognizes that JCE tracks the elements of conspiracy as a mode of liability for a completed war crime. Both
international and U.S. precedents have articulated harmless error rules that focus on the notice actually provided to the defendant. Notice to al
Bahlul complied with this standard. Al Bahlul’s conviction therefore passes muster under the Constitution, even if it doesn’t comport with Kevin
and Steve’s stricter test.

Topics: Civil Liberties and Constitutional Rights, Extraterritoriality, Guantanamo, Guantanamo: Litigation, Guantanamo: Litigation: D.C. Circuit, International Law, Terrorism Trials &
Investigations, Terrorism Trials: Military Commissions, Military Justice
Tags: Al Bahlul

Peter Margulies is a professor at Roger Williams University School of Law, where he teaches Immigration Law, National Security
Law and Professional Responsibility. He is the author of Law’s Detour: Justice Displaced in the Bush Administration (New York:
NYU Press, 2010).

